An investigation by the New York Times found that Israel, in the weeks after the attack by Hamas on October 7, greatly underestimated its defense system to facilitate the attack on Gaza, used flawed methods to find targets and assess the risk to civilians.
The Israeli army acknowledged the changes to its rules of engagement but said they were made in the context of an unprecedented military threat and remain in line with the laws of war.
Here are some of the key takeaways from the investigation.
Increased human damage limit per pre-shutdown strike
In previous conflicts with Hamas, Israeli officials were often allowed to put fewer than 10 civilians at risk in a given strike. In most cases the limit was five, or even zero.
At the beginning of this war, the Israeli army increased that limit to 20, before reducing it in certain cases a month later. Strikes that could injure more than 100 people will also be allowed on a case-by-case basis.
An extended list of targets
Israel greatly increased the number of troops it wanted to attack. Police will now not only pursue a small group of senior Hamas commanders, weapons depots and rocket launchers that were the focus of previous campaigns, but also thousands of low-ranking soldiers and those indirectly involved in military affairs.
Limits on how many civilians can be put at risk each day have been lifted
The military’s leadership briefly warned that their forces could be at risk of killing up to 500 people a day in planned strikes. Two days later, this restriction was lifted, allowing officials to conduct as many strikes as they deemed legal.
Shot very quickly to check all targets well
The pace of the bombing campaign was one of the most intense in 21st-century warfare, which officials said made it extremely difficult to accurately assess targets. Israel has dropped or fired nearly 30,000 weapons in Gaza in the first seven weeks, at least 30 times more than the US-led coalition fired in the first seven weeks of its bombing campaign against ISIS.
A simple risk assessment was used
Israel used to use a simple statistical model to assess the risk of civilian casualties: It always estimates the number of civilians in a building where a target is believed to be hiding using a formula based largely on the level of cell phone use in the surrounding area.
Large, inaccurate bombs were dropped
In previous wars, the air force often used “roof knock,” small arms to give civilians some time to escape an approaching attack. From the first day of the war, Israel greatly reduced its use of knocking on the roof. The military sometimes used less accurate “deaf bombs,” as well as 2,000-pound bombs.
Used AI to suggest targets
Israel used an artificial intelligence system in a widespread way for the first time. It helped officials analyze and sign off on targets more quickly, increasing the number of targets officials could raise each day.
Delayed strikes
Hours often passed between an officer surveying a target and the air force striking him. This meant that strikes often relied on outdated intelligence.
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